Introduction To Special Needs Essay

According to Warnock’s report of 1978, the special educational needs can be fluctuating and can also be contextually defined. Before the evaluation of this statement, we have to look at the Warnock report (1978) and the Special Educational Needs Code (2001) and how it reflects its understanding of the special educational needs. The term special education needs (SEN) emerged from the 1978’s Warnock’s committee that had been set up to hold an inquiry into the education of the physically handicapped children and other young people who were interested in education. It was under the department of education and science in Britain. The Warnock’s committee   had been set up to look into a concern that was coming up concerning the system of education which was becoming segregated and was discriminating against children who were physically challenged and was not providing them with   positive, social and better educational opportunities like the other children who were physically fit. This report of 1978 advocated for three main reforms that were to be undertaken by the educational officials or all those who were responsible for the provision of educational services: A. Locational integration of all children whereby the provision of educational services for both the children with special needs and their counterparts who were not physically challenged were to be made from the same site(Great Britain parliament 2006) B. Social integration whereby all the children regardless of their physical state were to share the same social amenities that were provided by the educational centers for example playgrounds and other extra facilities for co-curricular activities. C. The Warnock report advocated for functional integration of the children with special needs and those who were not physically challenged were all to be educated together for example they were to share the same classes whereby they were all supposed to be given the same opportunity in pursuing the same goals that had been set in the curriculum and any other objectives that were set by the educational administrators (Great Britain Parliament 2006). Practices of SEN prior to Warnock. There were many practices that were in place before the Warnock report of 1978 which were mainly directed to children with special needs. Before the report was made the children with special needs for example those who were suffering from a disability of the mind were classified as uneducable and unfit for the education that was offered at school. These children who had some inabilities were simply locked out of the normal learning institutions where the other children who had all abilities in a normal state were being educated. Prior to the Warnock report of 1978, there were other practices that were directed toward the children who had some inabilities for example those who had a problem with their mind, those who were partially blind, those who could not speak properly or those who had language problem, those who were physically challenged and many other children who had some form of either physically challenge or internal challenges for example a mind problem. These children were classified as uneducable under the normal schools and were forced to be educated and trained in special care units that were spread across England and some other hospitals that had been given the mandate of educating these learners with some form of disability. The health officials in this hospitals and special care units had been given the powers to be in charge of these children and to give them the required form of education. It is pretty obvious that in these centers where these learners with special needs were segregated to offered low quality education to them as compared to their peers who were being educated in the normal schools that had highly or better qualified teachers ( Farrell 2001) Before the Warnock report of 1978, the parents of the children with special needs were not given an opportunity to air their views on the form of education that their children were being subjected to or to give any views regarding to the state of their children and what their children need. But after the report came into place in 1978, the parents of the disabled children were given an opportunity to give views and any information that was regarded professional concerning their disabled children as this was very important regarding to the provision of services that were necessary for them. The report agreed that the parents or guardians of these children had vital information regarding to the assessment, placement and educational processes of their children that were to be included or incorporated in the education al system in order to achieve all the goals and objectives of the educational curriculum.( Rogers 2007). Reasons why the Warnock report of 1978 was such a break through. The report made a breakthrough in the implementation of some educational issues that were affecting the children who had some form of deformities. There are many reasons why it is considered a success. First was the fact that it recognized children who had some inabilities as a deserving lot who also needed to be given equal opportunities to all educational opportunities just like the other normal children. This is the main reason why the report had to introduce the idea of special education needs (SEN) which was based on common educational goals for all the children of school going age regardless of their abilities i.e. whether physically challenged or not. The children under this category were also given the privileges that others who were not challenged in any way were being given for example independence, enjoyment and understanding. It has to be known that before the Warnock report, all the children who had any form of disability were classified and defined using medical terms for example maladjusted and educationally subnormal and they were all segregated and given separate special educational treatment in different centers that had been set up all over England. The Warnock report brought all this to an end when it brought into the attention of the people and those who were working in the ministry of education the importance of having unsegregated form of education where all children were treated equally regardless of their abilities or deformities (parliamentary copyright 2006). There are other reasons why Warnock report became such a breakthrough. Other than putting a stop on the segregation of children with special needs or those who are faced with some form of disabilities, the Warnock report led to the introduction of the policies whereby parents of the physically challenged children gave opinions or any other information regarding their children which was deemed as useful in the implementation of educational policies and in the provision of the necessary materials in order to achieve the highest learning goals for this learners. Prior to the report in 1978, parents of the children with special abilities could not give any information regarding to or concerning their children. The children were sent to centers that had been set up to give them some form of education and there wasn’t any form of participation from the parents. After the report was written parents became involved in the educational activities of their disabled children which in turn led to the improvement of facilities that the children could access and use since the parents gave useful information regarding the state of their children (Parliamentary copyright 2006). The report required that all teachers who had any form of responsibility for the children with special needs to be trained in one way or another in order for them to have some considerable expertise regarding special education. This was necessary since all the children were now required to attend the same ordinary schools and since the report stated that per every five children who were going to school there was one who needed special attention. And since this child who needed special attention could no longer be isolated from the rest of the class who had all the required abilities then it forced the teachers to undergo some form of training in order to be able to handle all the learners in a professional way. It is a breakthrough in the report since this idea cemented the earlier opinions of having all the children attending the same ordinary schools. The teachers were also made aware of the importance of working closely with the parents of the children with special needs, other pr ofessionals and non-professionals who were concerned in helping those children who had special needs (Warnock 1978, p226) Warnock report (1978) on special education needs (SEN) – what was new: The report spoke a lot that was new concerning special education needs. First, the idea of educating both the handicapped children and those who were not handicapped was itself a new idea. It is known that before the Warnock (1978) report, the disabled children were all educated separately. The ones had some bodily disability, some disability of the mind and those who had no form of disability were all kept separately when it came to matters of education. Therefore the recommendation that they all get to be educated together was in itself a new idea to the special education needs of the children with some form of disability. Training of teachers who were handling ordinary schools in order for them to be able to handle the learners who had a requirement for special education need was also a new thing that was being proposed by the Warnock report on special education needs. Before the report, teachers of the ordinary schools where only the learners who were considered normal went to, had no formal training on handling learning learners with special needs. The learners who had a need for special education were left to be trained in secluded learning centers that were specifically meant for them where they had some given professionals who took care of their educational needs. Therefore the introduction of the idea that all teachers be given some form of education in relation to the teaching of the leaners with special needs was in itself a new idea (Alur & Hegarty 2002). The idea of using the opinions of parents was not there before the Warnock report (1978). It was a new idea that was being introduced. The parents of the children with special education needs were in cooperated in the learning activities of their children and any opinion that they gave, was given consideration. Also other individuals who were either professionals or non-professionals but were interested in helping the needy children were also given a chance to participate in the education of the children. Special unit classes were to be set up in the ordinary schools to carter for the children who had extreme special needs. The location of both the special needs schools and the ordinary schools was to be in the same place i.e. same compound. The two schools were to share the same site. This form of integration was to bring worthwhile gains in terms of the children socializing together and growing up in an environment that will eventually dictate mutual understanding of each other. The parents too of these children will end feeling encouraged just from the mere fact that their children are also attending ordinary schools. On the side of the children who are disabled, they get to copy from their peers whom they are sharing the same amenities with for example playing fields (Warnock report 1978, p101). Social interchange is another new idea imposed by the Warnock report (1978). The children with special needs and others who attend the same school but are not challenged in any way are given an opportunity to eat, play and consort together. This kind of social interchange that was new to special needs, gives the learners some form of self-recognition and easy acceptance of their condition. Before the Warnock report, children were brought up separately in schools. Those who went through this form of segregation had difficulties in accepting themselves as they were shown from an early age that they were different from the other children. After the report was made, the learners were integrated and the young ones who begun off in this later system found it so easy to accept their present condition. Evaluation of Warnock’s original statement Warnock’s original statement on integration of the learning environment to include both the children with special needs and other young learners who were in nee d of education with those who were considered normal learners does have validity today. This idea has brought an end to the acts that were there before whereby disabled children could either be denied education or put into some centers where they received minimal education. Today, not only in England where this report was made but also in the entire world, all children are given education regardless of their state. They are not discriminated due to their physical outlook. They are admitted to ordinary schools just like there other counterparts who are considered to be normal. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also adopted the policy of integration and is advocating for the education of all the children regardless of their disability in order to make the world a better plac e.

Low Involvement Theory Essay

1.0 BACKGROUND OF FOUNDER They are two founders who developed Interpersonal Deception Theory. Judee Burgoon or known as Professor Burgoon is the director of Human Communication Research for The Management of Information Centre. Besides that, she is also She is Professor of Communication and Professor of Family Studies and Human Development at the University of Arizona She was the PHD holder from West Virgina University. Professor Burgoon has authored 7 books and over 240 articles, chapters and reviews related to nonverbal and relational communication, interpersonal relationship, the impact of new communication technologies on human and human-computer interaction, and other researches. Among the theories that she almost notably linked are Interpersonal Adaptation Theory, Expectancy Violations Theory and Interpersonal Deception Theory. During her career, she has received many awards such as, NCA’s Golden Anniversary Monographs Awards, the Charles H. Woolbert Research Award for Scholarship of Lasting Impact. In 1999, she got the National Communication Association’s Distinguished Scholar Award, its highest award for lifetime of scholarly achievement. While in 2006, she awarded the Steven Chaffee Career Productivity Award. The awards that she gained show that she was talented American Academic. The second founder is David Buller. Professor David Buller was the Professor at Northern Illinois University. He was the philosophy professor. Besides that he also was the writer. Among his publication are Function, Selection and Design, in 1999, Adapting Minds, Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature in 2005. He has also contributed a lot in writing articles to books and journals. During his career, Buller has experience in finance, management, operations and sales. He has served as chairman of the Writing Committee for Social Studies Standards for Minnesota public schools. In his community he has served on the Hugo Planning Commission and political party precinct chair. As an active member of several professional organizations, he has been president of both the Strategic Leadership Forum and the Association for Corporate Growth. He was also a leader of the Edison Electric Institute Strategy Group and the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals. He was graduated from the Centre for Business Intelligence. He was died in 2011. 2.0 BACKGROUND OF THEORY Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) explain the interplay between active deceivers and detectors who communicate with multiple motives, who behave strategically, whose communication behaviours mutually influence one another to produce a sequence of moves and countermoves, and whose communication is influenced by the situation in which the deception transpires (EmGriffin, 2000). IDT attempts to explain the manner in which individuals deal with actual or perceived deception on the conscious and subconscious levels while engaged in face-to-face communication (Buller, 1996). This theory is an interpersonal theory that a set of unchanging assumptions concerning interpersonal communication in general and deception in particular. This theory is developed by Judee Burgoon and David Buller. The core ideas of IDT can be divided into two which are Interpersonal communication is interactive and strategies deception demands mental effort. Firstly, interpersonal communication is interactive means that interaction, rather than individuality, is at the core of their theory. For instance, if the encounter between you and Pat actually took place, both of you would be active participants, constantly adjusting your behaviour in response to feedback from each other. Whatever story you tell, you shouldn’t expect Pat to remain verbally and nonverbally mute (EmGriffin, 2000). (Judee K.Burgoon, 1996) Second idea is strategies deception demands mental efforts which means that successful deceiver must consciously manipulate information to create a plausible message, present it in a sincere manner, monitor reactions, prepare follow-up responses, and get ready for damage control of a tarnished image-all at the same time. For example, If you choose to be less than honest in your surprise encounter with Pat, you may find yourself unable to attend to every aspect of deception, and some of your communication behaviour will go on à ¢â‚¬Å"automatic pilot.† (EmGriffin, 2000). 3.0 MAIN CONCEPTS/ VARIABLES 3.1 Leakage Leakage concept is the behaviour outside of the deceptive Sender’s conscious control, mostly nonverbal in character, can signal dishonesty and it is applied in IDT. The concept was developed by Miron Zuckerman, who created a four-factor model to explain when and why leakage is apt to occur (A.Fos, 2005). First, deceiver’s intense attempt to control information can produce performances that come across as too slick. Second, lying causes physiological arousal. Third, the predominant felt emotions that accompany deceit are guilt and anxiety. Fouth, the complex cognitive factors involved in deception can tax the brain beyond its capacity (EmGriffin, 2000). Under the four-factor model the extreme concentration required by an individual engaged in deception and employing the compensating mechanisms to mask that deceit may result in their performance appearing polished or rehearsed. Lying also causes a sender to become psychologically and physiological aroused. Suc h arousal is difficult to mask and will eventually evidence itself. It is this very principle on which the polygraph machine is base (A.Fos, 2005). 3.2 Truth bias According to Burgoon and Buller, people tend to regard interpersonal message as honest, complete, direct, relevant and clear although when the speaker lying to them. McCornack claims that there exists an implied social contract that all of us will be honest with each other. It means that a mutual understanding that our messages will reflect reality as we know it. Besides that, Burgoon and Buller also convinced that people who know and like each other are particularly resistant to doubting ach others’ words. For example, the warmth relationships are motivated to find truth in whatever the other says and thus overlook or rationalize away statements that others might find questionable. (EmGriffin, 2000). 3.3 Suspicion Buller and Burgoon picture suspicion as a mid-range mind-set, located somewhere between truth and falsity. In spite of the many ways that respondents could become suspicious, Buller and Burgoon have found that it’s difficult to induce a deep-seated scepticism. Doubters tend to favour indirect methods to gain more information, but there is scant evidence that these probes help unmask deception (Judee K.Burgoon, 1996). Suspicion occurs when someone is tried to find the truth from the others. The person becomes suspicious with people who make them unconfident to believe what the others talk about. It usually happens when the person does not believe what the person says and he/she will not accept the word hundred percent truths. For instance, when you have cheated by someone, it is hard to believe that person again. You become suspicious to whatever the person says to you. 3.4 Interactivity Interpersonal deception theory views deception through the interactivity of interpersonal communication. As such, it considers deception as an interactive process between a sender and receiver. In contrast with previous studies of deception that focused on the sender and receiver individually, IDT focuses on the dyadic, relational and dialogic of deceptive communication. Next, Dyadic communication refers to communication between two people. A dyad is a group of two people between whom messages are sent and received. While relational means that refers to communication in which meaning is created by two people simultaneously filling the roles of both sender and receiver. Dialogic activity refers to the active communicative language of the sender and receiver, each relying upon the other within the exchange. Deception uses when the communication of one participant is deliberately false. For a variety of reasons, including receivers’ own cognitive loading from ongoing information management and the development of rapport between parties as interaction unfolds, receivers will typically judge senders more favorably than passive observers. Obviously, there is a correlation between the level of favorable impression of the sender and the ultimate chances of undetected deception (Burgoon, 1996). 3.5 Strategic behaviour When the Receiver doubts the truthfulness of the information conveyed they will give clues in the form of non-typical behaviours. This will occur even if they attempt to mask such behaviours. Strategic behaviour is the proper behaviour or reaction that people use to act like nothing is happen or trying to hide a secret or the truth. However, deceptive senders are by their nature more attuned to sensing suspicion than the receivers are to sensing deception. Thus, senders will adjust their message and its manner of presentation if they sense suspicion. This serves to make deception all the more difficult to detect. For instance, there is what is known as the â€Å"Othello error.† Individuals who are actually telling the truth behave in the same way when falsely accused or confronted with suspicion as do those guilty of actual deception. The term Othello error refers to the situation where a truth teller’s adaptation to a false accusation strikes the respondent as devious (Hearn, 2006). 3.6 Deception in Communication Buller and Burgoon are more concerned with an individual’s motivation than with their actual actions in determining deception. In their work they found that every deceptive act has, at its core, at least one of three motivations. The first is to accomplish some task or attain some goal. Second, the communication may be directed at maintaining or creating a relationship with the other party. Finally, deception is often used to save face of one or both of the parties to the communication. Most people are uncomfortable when engaging in deception. One way in which they deal with this feeling is to attempt to disassociate from the behaviour. For example, when people try to lie they try to react like normal but there must be something different like reducing eye contact or through their body movement. (Judee K.Burgoon, 1996) The other ways that senders deal with the deception is to engage in their masking behaviour. Masking is an attempt to protect the sender’s self-image and their relationship with the Receiver. When engaging in intentional deception senders will attempt to restrain any bodily cues which may signal deception. They may also engage in compensating behaviour, such as exhibiting extreme sincerity. The difficulty is that the detection of all of these behaviours can only be done if they are measured against the sender’s base-line behaviours (Judee K.Burgoon, 1996). 3.7 Falsification, Concealment and Equivocation One strategy is falsification where the deceiving party also referred as sender. While the person who is flat-out lies of the communication called as receiver. It means that the sender creates a fiction to deceit. For example the sender will creates a story that not really happen just only to lie or hide the truth. The second type of deception is concealment. In concealment the sender omits certain material facts which results in deceptive communication. Finally, equivocation is included in the roster of deceptive behaviour. When employing equivocation the Sender skirts issues by, for instance, by changing the subject or offering indirect responses (Hearn, 2006). Nonverbal cues A nonverbal cue is important element in IDT. People can detect deception through non verbal cues. Although people can manipulate their words, however it is difficult to hide their truth nonverbal cues. Nonverbal cues are including facial expression, eye contact, gestures and touch. When someone try to hide secret or lie, they are difficult to hide their facial expression and especially their eye contact with others. They try to reduce the eye contact with others and the way they talk, they move or react is little bit different from their usual reaction. 4.0 Development of IDT Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) is generating from the concept of nonverbal cues to detect deception during conversation. The idea of this study was come from Sigmund Freud who studied about nonverbal cues in detecting deception among people. In his study, Freud observed a patient being asked about his darkest feelings. If his mouth was shut and his fingers were trembling, he was considered to be lying. From the situation, he tried to study more about nonverbal cues. Then, in 1989, DePaulo and Kirkendol developed the Motivation Impairment Effect (MIE). This occurs when a person’s motivation to succeed at lying negatively affects on the person’s performance, making the lie less convincing. (Kirekendol, 2011). MIE states the harder people try to deceive others, the more likely they are to get caught. Burgoon and Floyd, however, revisited this research and formed the idea that deceivers are more active in their attempt to deceive than most would anticipate or expect. For instance, DePaulo has estimated the human ability to detect deception at 53%, which she states is â€Å"not much better than flipping a coin.† She has also stated that â€Å"human accuracy is really just better than chance.† (Hearn, 2006). In 1996, IDT was developed by two communication professors, David B. Buller and Judee K. Burgoon. They restudied the studies made by Sigmund Freud, nonverbal cues, and then they observed DePaulo and Kirkendol† studies which they developed about Motivation Impairment Effect. Judee Burgoon and David Buller then combined both studies and they studied in depth about deception in conversation among people. Prior to their study, deception had not been fully considered as a communication activity, it is more like theory of communication strategies use to lie or hide the truth information from others. Previous work had focused upon the formulation of principles of deception. The principles of Interpersonal Deception Study were derived by evaluating the lie detection ability of individuals observing unidirectional communication (Hearn, 2006). The early studies of Interpersonal Deception Theory found initially that, although humans are far from perfect in their efforts to diagnose lies, they are substantially better at the task than would result merely by chance. However, this statement should be contrasted with subsequent statements made by the same researchers. Buller and Burgoon discount the value of highly controlled studies. Therefore, IDT is based on two-way communication and intended to describe deception as an interactive communicative process (Hearn, 2006). Based over years of the author’s and other scholars’ research, IDT expound on the dynamics properties of interpersonal communication, nonverbal behaviour, message processing, credibility and deception as it is achieved through interpersonal interaction. 5.0 Application of IDT IDT demonstrate that people are poor at detecting deception. Thus, it is crucial that one not rely upon a perceived ability to detect deception in the negotiation context. There are habitual liars who compulsively engage in deception. However, most people do not lie without reason. It is natural to think that deception would be beneficial to any negotiating party. Many statements will be made in the course of a negotiation. Not all statements will completely true or completely false. The language used to achieve a specific task can be varied as the people who feel a need to deceive. Yet Buller and Burgoon list some characteristic that reflect strategic intent. 5.1 Uncertainty and vagueness If we do not want our friend to know about our absent for class yesterday, we must keep the answer short and noncommittal. If we say, â€Å"I’m sick† the brevity precludes detail to challenge (Burgoon, 2000). Another way is to speak in the passive voice and use indefinite pronouns. 5.2 Nonimmediacy, reticence, and withdrawal We wish not to be there when our friend ask why we did not come to class yesterday. That desire to be out of the situation is often encoded in nonverbal actions. We might sit further apart that others, or lean back rather than forward as our answer. Words also can show nonimmediacy when the speaker changes verbs from present to past tense (Burgoon, 2000). 5.3 Disassociation This is the way of distancing yourself from what you have done. Levelers are inclusive terms that do this by removing individual choice (Burgoon, 2000). For example, we will tell our friends that everyone has done it and not attending class is normal. All of these linguistic constructions sever the personal connection between the actor and the act of deception. 5.4 Image- and relationship-protecting behavior Since discovery could hurt their reputations and threaten their relationship, they consciously strive to suppress the bodily cues that might signal deception. To mask the cues that leak out despite their best efforts, they try to appear extra sincere. Deceivers tend to nod in agreement when the respondent speaks, avoid interrupting, and smile frequently (Burgoon, 2000). 5.5 Flood the circuits Interpersonal Deception Theory demonstrates that when a Sender’s cognitive abilities are â€Å"overloaded† they will begin to leak. It stands to reason that the greater the load, the greater the leak and the easier its detection. Another major premise of Interpersonal Deception Theory is that individuals are poor lie detectors in one-on-one communication situations. Thus, it would appear to be to a negotiator’s advantage to increase the load on their opposite (Burgoon, 2000). 5.6 Falsification, Concealment and Equivocation One strategy is falsification where the deceiving party also referred as sender. While the person who is flat-out lies of the communication called as receiver. It means that the sender creates a fiction to deceit. For example the sender will creates a story that not really happen just only to lie or hide the truth. The second type of deception is concealment. In concealment the sender omits certain material facts which results in deceptive communication. Finally, equivocation is included in the roster of deceptive behaviour. When employing equivocation the Sender skirts issues by, for instance, by changing the subject or offering indirect responses (Hearn, 2006).

Family Law Coursework Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

Family Law Coursework - Essay Example Analysis First of all, the issue that is at hand is that James and Cara have not been living together for the past eight years. However, Cara has been performing all of the housework and maintaining of children since the two have been split up. Therefore, one can argue that Cara’s caring for the children might be considered to be domestic work that would influence her share of how much she would receive, equity-wise, in the house. However, different courts have treated the value of housework and child care differently in this regard. For instance, take the case of Burns v. Burns.2 In this case, the plaintiff did not contribute monetarily to the property and the maintenance of the property. However, she contributed value to the household by her role as a homemaker. The Burns court found, however, that this was not enough, and that the plaintiff did not have the right to a beneficial entitlement to the home because she did not contribute monetarily towards this. This case was ba cked up by the case of Oxley v. Hiscock.3 In Oxley, there were two unmarried people who owned a home and were cohabiting, just as in the case of Burns, and in the case at bar. While both parties had contributed towards the purchase of the home in Oxley, but the court did not consider the value of the plaintiff being a homemaker in that case, either, so the plaintiff did not get an increased value in her beneficial stake in the home because she was a homemaker. Abbott v. Abbott4 came to the same conclusion, stating that only monetary contributions could suffice for determining an equitable stake in property, although some conduct may be considered, if the conduct is directly related to the house itself. For instance, conduct which improved the value of the house, such as manually making repairs, would be considered, but conduct which is indirect, such as homemaking or housekeeping, would not be considered. However, another case, Drake v. Whipp5 came to a different conclusion. In this case, the female partner made under 20% of the financial contributions towards the shared home, but was awarded 33% of the property, in part because of her contributions as a homemaker. Other cases that were before the Burns case are also relevant. For instance, in Pettit v. Pettit,6 which involved a married couple, the husband did not contribute financially towards the couple's home, which was in the separate name of the wife before marriage. He labored on the home, but the court still found that he was not entitled to a beneficial interest in the home. In Gissing v. Gissing,7 the couple was unmarried, and the husband did not contribute financially to the home. He did, however, buy furniture and do chores, such as mow the lawn. Again, the court did not find a beneficial interest for the husband in this case. Lloyds Bank v. Rosset8 is yet another case that found that conduct alone would not give rise to a beneficial interest – in that case, the wife undertook actions that im proved the home, yet she did not contribute financially to the home. The wife was denied a beneficial interest, and the Lloyds court found that anything less than direct contributions to the purchase price of a home, or towards the mortgage, would suffice to show the intention of the parties that

Women, Minority Ethnic Groups, and Transform Unions Essay - 1

Women, Minority Ethnic Groups, and Transform Unions - Essay Example Various steps have been taken by trade unions to ameliorate this imbalance in the form of making provision for the reserved seat for minority ethnic groups and women and by allowing for proportionate representation. Irrespective of the fact that such transformational steps have been adopted by the trade unions since the last few decades, the mindset of the trade unions still remains quiet patriarchal and majority oriented (Heery & Salmon, 2000). Now is the time for the trade unions to meditate on the impact of women and minority ethnic groups in the union culture and as to have these marginalized segments of the British workforce have contributed to and facilitated the revival and survival of the trade unions in the UK (Heery & Salmon, 2000). This article investigates the augmenting diversity in the British workforce and the biases being faced by the ethnic minority groups and women at the workplace. One purpose of the paper is to identify as to how these sidelined segments of the Br itish workforce tend to redress the workplace discrepancies by trying to transform the trade unions. The paper also looks into as to how the trade unions respond to the demand for change emanating from the ethnic minority groups and women. This paper is based on the available academic and online sources pertaining to the topic under consideration. Hence it is possible that it may leave untouched some facets of the concerns and expectations of the ethnic minority and female workers. Still, it will try its best to have an insight into the dynamics of trade unions with respect to members affiliated to the ethnic minority groups and women. In a broad context, diversity is universal in the sense that every individual tends to differ from other.  

Marketing Environment of the Czech Republic Essay

Marketing Environment of the Czech Republic - Essay Example After its break with the Slovak Republic, the Czech nation rapidly privatized state-owned businesses. State ownership of businesses was at about 97 percent under communism—today it is less than 20 percent. The country is also reducing its dependence on highly polluting brown coal as an energy source, turning more toward nuclear energy. Unquestionably, the integral part of the history of Czech culture is Czech traditions. The traditions are mostly maintained in villages, especially in the Moravian-Silesian region, where they remain as a sign of the cultural taste of the specific areas. Traditional costumes are increasingly popular among Czech people and are also appreciated by foreign visitors. Tourism is a rapidly developing sector, and millions come to Prague to visit castles, palaces, and spas. Although the political and financial crises of 1997 eroded somewhat the countrys stability and prosperity, the Czech Republic succeeded in becoming a NATO member in 1999 and a European Union member in 2004. Czech culture has firm roots in a rich and plentiful history. Tourists and visitors from all over the world can marvel at some of the most beautiful and oldest pieces of architecture, literature and fine arts. Public administration or the management of public services is decentralized in the Czech Republic. Currently, there are only several compact issues managed directly and purely by the highest administrative level - the state. The Czech Republic uses several electoral systems and formulas for recounting votes into mandates. All elections are held on the basis of confidentiality, generality and equality. Direct voting prevails. In international relations, the Czech Republic seeks to represent itself as a democratic nation and a politically, economically and socially stable state in Central Europe. It seeks to promote not only its particular interests but also to

Fractal Geometry Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Fractal Geometry - Essay Example In colloquial speech fractal is a shape which is self-similar or recursively constructed. It means that such shape is similar at all levels of magnification and therefore it is sometimes called "infinitely complex". In the sphere of mathematic the word "fractal" means geometric object "that satisfies a specific technical condition, namely having a Hausdoff dimension greater than its topological dimension". (26) The simplest fractal is known to be Cantor Bar Set which was called after German famous mathematician. It is necessary to admit that fractals refer not only to the realm of geometry and mathematics. They can be found everywhere in natural world. Self-similarity (recursive nature) means that fractals are constructed by iteration and they are made up of the smaller parts (copies) of themselves. The examples of self-similarity are Sierpinski Gasket, the Mandelbrot Set, Self-affine fractals, etc. it must be admitted that fractals are not all self-similar objects. Scientists found out three main types of self-similarity: Exact self-similarity means that fractals are completely identical at all levels of magnification. It is the strongest type of self-similarity, because fractals bear exact and complete self-similarity. Quasi-self similarity is a loose form of self-similarity. It means that fractals are approximately identical, but not completely.

Job description and analysis Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Job description and analysis - Essay Example On the other hand, removing Helen from the group may result in the loss of her exceptional knowledge and skills from the group. This leaves the Harmening’s first option whereby Katie can make efforts to smooth out the process. She needs to understand clearly the genesis of the problem through talking to the group members and encouraging them to raise particular issues that they think should be addressed. A careful analysis of the group’s responses will offer a good foundation towards smoothing out the process. Task analysis is necessary in this situation to determine the whether Helen is properly equipped to perform her tasks effectively. Without proper equipment and space, she may certainly desire to use other people’s working space which might be more appealing than her own. If she has all the requirements and doesn’t perform her tasks on time, then she needs to be asked to explain the reasons and also to be reminded to pay attention to the time limit for completion of the tasks. On the other hand, if her knowledge and skills demand greater responsibility, her tasks can be adjusted to keep her engaged in the extra time in which she has been roaming to co-workers (Harmening 175). Katie needs to develop a list of duties for all members of the group including Helen and to ensure that all of them understand their tasks and that no one should interfere with those of another person unless when asked to help. Interaction within the group should be aimed at increasing efficiency a nd not lowering the speed of performing tasks (Harmening 177). All employees need to understand the employer’s expectations and hence a performance evaluation should not come as a surprise for Helen. Katie needs to make Helen understand the trend in the turnaround time since she joined the group. This revelation should enlighten Helen with regards to her role in this new development without causing her embarrassment

Evaluate. examine and compare the innovative capacities of the Islamic Research Paper

Evaluate. examine and compare the innovative capacities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that of Angola - Research Paper Example Nevertheless, the result is a scholarship on political economy that is "now back to a more balanced emphasis on all three" (Schmidt, 15) ---notwithstanding the differences between American and British traditions in political economy (Maliniak and Tierney, 1). According to Maliniak and Tierney, the American school of political economy is positivist and empiricist while the British school is more explicitly normative and interpretative. A comparative political economy approach allows us to derive lessons useful for advancing knowledge and informing policy. We have this in mind as we study and compare the cases of Angola and the Islamic Republic of Iran. We choose the two countries because relatively little is known on the two countries. We apply our comparative political economy approach to Angola and the Islamic Republic, focusing on the role of political economy on national innovative capacity. Porter and Stern define national innovative capacity as the countries potential "to produce a stream of commercially relevant innovation" (5).1 They emphasize that national innovative capacity is a product of the countrys technological sophistication, number of scientific and technical labor force, investments, and policy choice.2 Viewed in this perspective, national innovative capacity is definitely an outcome of a political economy environment that promotes technological sophistication, size of scientific and technical l abor force, investments, and competition. Further, the Porter-Stern notion of national innovative capacity also emphasizes on the political and economic entities of countries (5) and, therefore, this constitutes another stress on a political economy perspective. In contrast, the political economy perspective on innovation of Cowhey and Aronson stresses on how a combination of technological innovation, market strategies, and political entrepreneurship shapes the global economy,

The Psychology of Marketing Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words - 1

The Psychology of Marketing - Essay Example Value possession can be judged on the ground of materialism and personal trait. Customers prefer value possessions are not always status seeker because sometimes they purchase valuable product to show self image to external world. Researchers have pointed out that customers do valued material possession to show adjusted and refined self image (perceived self image of customer which might differ from real self assessment of the person). Sometimes customer purchase valued product in order to imitate other person’s purchasing habit. Many of the time it has been observed that purchasing valued item increases confidence level among customers. Opinion leaders also plays significant role to motivate customers to purchase valuable product. General trend shows that materialists have a tendency to purchase valuable item in bulk volume by spending huge amount of money on acquiring new items. These customers are lucrative target for marketers. Marketers decide unique business strategy to cater demand of high value customers. Why Valued? Value of a product is dependent on various factors such as brand name attached with the item, usability, social image and many others. Value of product can be analyzed in the following manner. Possession might help us to reflect personality we want to show cast to external world. ... Purchasing a particular might help us to achieve highly respected social group membership. Purchasing product and then consuming it help us to evaluate our self image in a right manner. The process can be classified as symbol for us to show our connection with significant portion of society. Many customers believe purchasing a valuable item associated with strong brand image might help them to achieve ideal self image and ideal social self image. Psychographics of consumer behaviour is contributed by two variables. 1-Actulizers- customers belong to uppermost income group prefer to spend huge sum of money on in order to purchase premium priced products. They purchase high net worth products in order to show status and financial power. 2- Fulfilled- customers purchase high value product after gathering sufficient information about the product in order to show social status to other people (Young, and Pagoso, 2008, p. 116). Customers show various types of purchasing behaviour including impulsive and compulsive buying. In 1989, O’Guinn and Faber have argued that compulsive buying is a result of behavioural disorder and directly linked with attitude of consumers to purchase valuable products. In 2004, Roberts and Pirog in their research paper have suggested that compulsive buying is linked with satisfying personal goal rather than rather than fulfilling need. In compulsive buying purchase motive of customer is cantered on satisfying external need rather than satisfying internal needs. In 2002, Kacen and Lee have pointed out that in valued possession customers get enjoyment from item purchased and sometimes they become obsessed about the purchase (Fitzmaurice, 2008, pp.

The Rhetorical Image of Free

The Rhetorical Image of Freedom Essay In Phillis Wheatleys poem, To the Right Honorable William†¦, evokes a spirit of an American vision that undermines that of Thomas Jeffersons Declaration of Independence, by reminding the Earl of Dartmouth that all should have freedom but for those who have obtained it, should not forget to thank God. Thomas Jeffersons vision of America is almost the same as Wheatleys with one major difference, his version doesnt include African Americans nor for that matter, equality for women. The words expressed, written, and agreed upon by our founding fathers, regards the vital importance to being free from Britain but ignore that the word man can mean mankind, human and not just white male (Arnold 2) Wheatleys version of America has a major difference with Thomas Jeffersons vision of America, she speaks for equality of African Americans and yet as she illustrates, freedom should be thanked by acknowledging God (Lauter 1243). In 1765 when the first echoing of dispute to British authority became obvious to Parliament, the frontier in America consisted of thirteen separate colonies. Each had a resident legislature which served on provincial soil, but which served only at the pleasure of a governor appointed by the crown. By July 2, 1776, in Philadelphia, the Continental Congress adopted the resolution, introduced by Richard Henry Lee and John Adams, which actually declared independence from Great Britain. It declared, in part, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved/ (Arnold 4) The Declaration, which explained why the Colonies that were now states declare their independence, after which was adopted by the Continental Congress July 4, 1776. The leading draftsman was Thomas Jefferson, assisted by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Robert R. Livingston, and Roger Sherman. Some of the text follows:We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or  to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness (GA 1). Jefferson, as others had complained that they felt King George of Britain had enslaved the people in the colonies and had forgotten their needs. When he wrote the crucial points of needing Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness, they were radical ideas written on paper but aired the need to justify that their Creator (God) was the authority who approved that men were created equal/ Hence, the reasoning behind the need to be liberated on their own terms (Arnold 2). Jeffersons message, forever written in our countrys history, uses strong language acknowledging the fact that people need to be free. On the other hand, history tells another story. Jeffersons vision of a free America is freedom for white men against their oppressor and failed to grant freedom to African Americans. Jefferson at the time argued that blacks were 3/5 humans and owned 200 slaves (7). He wasnt impressed with Phillis Wheatleys poetry or anything else she had to say (9). The Declaration of Independence immediately became the worlds foremost manifesto celebrating human rights and personal freedom. The fact of the matter is that America still had real slave issues to deal with (8). Wheatley, a former slave, wrote, the 1773 publication of Phillis Wheatleys Poems on Various Subjects established her as a young prodigy and defied the major justification for enslavement of Africans the European assumption of African inferiority. One of the best-known poems in the collection is dedicated To the Right Honourable William, Earl of Dartmouth, His Majestys Principal Secretary of State for North-America, Etc. Wheatley was encouraged by the appointment of Dartmouth, whom she had met in London. She knew that he was friends with the abolitionist Countess of Huntingdon and of the late Reverend George Whitefield, who had helped initiate the Great Awakening (VanSpanckeren 2). The poem opens with hopefulness that under Dartmouths blissful sway, the  colonies will see Freedoms charms unfold and experience an end to the reign of wanton Tyranny that meant tenslave the land. Those lines provide a subtle yet powerful segue into the next verse, in which she proposes that her love of Freedom and by the implication, that of the black Patriots, springs from the anguish Africans have known as slaves. In here lies vital information that she too loves freedom. To find this freedom, her parents in Africa, she notes, What pangs excruciating must molest, What sorrows labour in my parents breast?/ describe what they may have felt after she was kidnapped and brought to America. Perhaps including her experiences in the poem she reinforces that she too knows what it is like to come through the Atlantic and then be sold into slavery. She was a slave who found freedom. She has empathy for those had to make the difficult voyage to get here; fought to separate themselves from Britain because they felt enslaved and needed to be free just as the Declaration of Independence proposed (1243). The vision Wheatley wanted for America is just like that of Jefferson except for the fact that she wanted to include African Americas. The question she provokes to undermine the author of The Declaration of Independence would be how can he argue the need for freedom from bondage of your motherland and not free the African Americans he has in his own backyard (Arnold 8). For example, when she writes, And can I then pray others may never feel tyrannic sway?/ She asserts to the response that there are still enslaved people around. She wants them to obtain the same freedom America will have. She writes strong and eloquent words to the fact that she, like America, who were brought here and suffered with under the monarchy, was now free. Her journey on being brought here, although hard, still afforded her to overcome these experiences through finding God (1243). Jefferson mentions God as the Creator and permits his creations (man) to seek liberty (GA 1). Wheatley notes that through the celebration of finding liberty, one must thank God for it. The spirit of liberty and the disruptions of the Revolutionary era encouraged African American men and women to choose sides. They were either Patriots or Loyalists. They were a fundamental part of what this nation would become  (Arnold 10). This same spirit of liberty propelled Jefferson to write, The Declaration of Independence and Wheatleys, To the Honourable William†¦, which combines one ideal for America. This principle which the country was founded upon speaks volumes about the need of man to be free from their tyrant, whoever this tyrant is. Jefferson saw it as King George of England. Wheatley saw it as some people in power in America who didnt want African Americans free from their bondage. She used kinder words to express her opinions. In an ironic twist, Jefferson, whose final draft of The Declaration of Independence, was altered when he used very strong language referring to the Monarchy as enslaving the colonies and its people, helped establish equal rights for all minorities . It was his words that helped minorities win the case the first of equal rights in the Supreme Court in 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson, and the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that separate but equal accommodations were constitutional. (Hendrickson 2)Works CitedArnold, H. J. ed. The life of Thomas Jefferson. From Revolution to ReconstructionHTML project. http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/ (November 16, 2005)Lauter, Paul, ed. The Heath Anthology of American Literature: Volume A. Boston, MA:Houghton Mifflin Company. (2006)The Government Archives. http://www.archives.gov/. (November 5, 2005)Hendrickson, B. The Beginnings of the Civil Rights Movement. NAACP: Voices inAmerica.http://pblmm.k12.ca.us/projects/discrimination/AfricanAmerican/cvrights.html. (November 11, 2005)VanSpanckeren, Kathryn. Democratic Origins and Revolutionary Writers, 1776-1820:Phillis Wheatley (c.1753-1784). An Outline of American Literature. http://www.rlc.dcccd.edu/annex/comm/english/mah8420/ColonialPage.htm. (November 2,2005)

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually